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In striking down the death penalty for intellectually disabled and juvenile defen-
dants, Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons have been understandably heralded
as important holdings under the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that has
found the death penalty “disproportional” for certain types of defendants and crimes.
This Article argues, however, that the cases have a far more revolutionary reach than
their conventional understanding. In both cases the Court went one step beyond its
usual two-step analysis of assessing whether imposing the death penalty violated
“evolving standards of decency.” This extra step looked at why even though intel-
lectual disability and youth were powerful mitigators, juries were not able to reliably
use them in their decisionmaking. The Court thus articulated expressly for the first
time what this Article calls the “unreliability principle:” if too great a risk exists that
constitutionally protected mitigation cannot be reliably assessed, the unreliability
means that the death penalty cannot be constitutionally imposed. In recognizing the
unreliability principle, the Court has called into serious question the death penalty
for other offenders to whom the principle applies, such as mentally ill defendants.
And, unlike with the “evolving standards” analysis, the unreliability principle does
not depend on whether a national consensus exists against the practice. This Article
identifies the six Atkins-Roper factors that bring the unreliability principle into play
and shows why they make application of the death penalty to mentally ill defendants
unconstitutional. The principle, which finds its constitutional home in the cases of
Woodson v. North Carolina and Lockett v. Ohio, has profound implications for the
death penalty, and if taken to its logical endpoint calls into question the Court’s core
premise since Furman v. Georgia, that by providing individualized consideration
of a defendant and his crime, the death penalty decision will be free of arbitrariness.
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INTRODUCTION
After the Supreme Court in 1972 condemned the death penalty framework in
use at the time as unconstitutionally arbitrary and capricious in Furman v. Georgia,1
many, including at least several Justices, expected the punishment to fade away in
the aftermath.2 In the next four years, however, thirty-five states and Congress rushed
to pass new death penalty schemes,3 leaving the Court with the bewildering task of
1 See generally 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2 JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 413–14 (1994) (noting Justices
Stewart and White believed states would not enact new death penalty statutes); see also Corinna
Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2007) (documenting the
ebbing public support for the death penalty leading up to Furman).
3 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–80 (1976).
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trying to figure out if a way existed to correct the fundamental flaws that it had iden-
tified in Furman.4 The Court’s struggles in the ensuing decades to design and main-
tain a constitutional system of capital punishment has consumed more of the Court’s
docket and energy than perhaps any other constitutional controversy.5
Out of fairness to the Court, it is hard to imagine a task of greater difficulty and
immensity—how does one bring rationality, reliability, and consistency to the moral
and highly emotional judgment by one human being over another as to whether that
person should live or die? The challenge would be difficult enough for a philosopher
or a theologian, but it is especially daunting for a Court tasked with bringing the deci-
sion within the bounds of the rule of law. In fact, but a year before Furman, Justice
Harlan had suggested that the task was impossible: “To identify before the fact those
characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death
penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly under-
stood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond
present human ability.”6 Yet, despite Justice Harlan’s warning, five years later the
Court found itself trying to do exactly what Harlan had declared as “beyond present
human ability,” and, as a result, the Court has found itself engaged in an unparal-
leled level of constitutional micromanagement.
Indeed, in dealing with the aftermath of Furman, the Court has resembled more
of an overwhelmed constitutional triage unit than a solemn body of judgment as it
has rushed to each newly identified constitutional breach and erected a new rule. We
now have constitutional rules specific to capital punishment governing aggravating
factors,7 mitigating factors,8 the weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors,9 victim
4 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 256–57, 295 (Brennan, J., concurring) (describing these
fundamental flaws).
5 See, e.g., infra notes 7–33.
6 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971). In making this statement, the Court
was using the impossibility of the task to explain why it was not requiring the states to pro-
vide guidance to capital sentencers to meet Due Process, i.e., the task was “beyond present
human ability.” Id. The Court’s decision a year later in Furman that the failure to provide
such guidance violated the Eighth Amendment, meant, therefore, that the states now had to
undertake the very task that McGautha had declared “beyond present human ability” in order to
meet Furman’s objections.
7 See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (ruling that the aggravating circum-
stance that murder “was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhumane in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim” was impermissibly vague
as applied).
8 See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (requiring that the sentencer be allowed
to consider all mitigating evidence concerning the defendant or the crime that might serve as a
“basis for a sentence less than death”).
9 See, e.g., Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (approving jury instruction that told
the jury “[i]f you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circum-
stances, you shall impose a sentence of death”).
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impact evidence,10 rape of an adult,11 rape of a child,12 felony murder,13 intellectual
disability,14 age,15 lethal injection,16 future dangerousness,17 incompetence to be exe-
cuted,18 jurors who have doubts about the death penalty,19 jurors who are too strongly
for the death penalty,20 jurors where race is an issue,21 how individual jurors should
consider mitigation,22 not diminishing a juror’s sense of responsibility in imposing
the death penalty,23 what jurors must be told about alternative penalties,24 deadlocked
juries,25 lesser included offense instructions,26 equal protection claims at sentencing,27
10 See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (finding victim impact evidence,
which tells the sentencer about the victim and the impact of the victim’s loss, constitutionally
permissible).
11 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding the death penalty invalid for the
rape of an adult without murder).
12 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional
for the rape of a child under the age of twelve without death or the intent to result in death).
13 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (ruling the death penalty unconstitutional
for felony-murder where defendant neither kills nor knew death was highly likely to occur).
14 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional
for the intellectually disabled).
15 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (concluding that “evolving standards” of
decency barred imposition of the death penalty on juveniles).
16 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (holding that lethal injection did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment unless gratuitously painful).
17 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (concluding that future dangerousness as
an aggravator was not impermissible despite risk of error).
18 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (establishing that, to be executed, the con-
demned must be aware of “the punishment [he is] about to suffer and why [he is] to suffer it”).
19 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (holding that a juror can be dismissed
only if the juror’s beliefs would “substantially impair” ability to follow the law).
20 See, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (ruling that defendant has right during
voir dire to inquire whether venire persons would automatically impose the death penalty).
21 See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (defendant has right to question prospective
jurors about racial bias when accused of an interracial capital crime).
22 See, e.g., Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (jury unanimity requirements for
considering mitigating evidence violate Lockett).
23 See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (jury’s “sense of responsibility” for
death penalty must not be diminished).
24 See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999) (no constitutional right exists for jury
instruction on what happens if the jury cannot agree on a sentence, unless there is a “reasonable
likelihood” the jury will be “affirmatively misled” as to the consequence).
25 See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988) (concluding that dynamite charges, if
directed at furthering deliberation, do not violate the Constitution when the jury is deadlocked
on the sentence).
26 See, e.g., Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (a capital defendant is entitled to jury
instruction on possible lesser-included offenses).
27 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (requiring a showing of intentional
discrimination for equal protection violation).
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Miranda as applied to psychiatric exams for capital defendants,28 claims of innocence,29
ineffective assistance,30 prosecutorial misconduct,31 and clemency.32
And lest one think that these rules are simple clear-cut statements of law, each rule
has spawned its own elaborate subset of cases where the Court has tried to clarify,
refine, and spot-fix the problems that inevitably spring up with the announcement
of a new rule.33 The result has been the creation of a tangle of rules and rules-that-
clarify rules unlike any other area of the Constitution as the Court has strained to con-
tain the death penalty decision within the rule of law. And in the background of all
these rulings still looms the question that Justice Harlan posed on the eve of Furman:
does the very nature of the death penalty question simply defy the rule of law and the
ability to ensure reliability and consistency?
This Article returns to that question, as have many articles and cases through the
years, but through a prism of cases that generally have not been thought of as bearing
directly on the question: the Court’s landmark holdings in Atkins v. Virginia34 and
28 See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (ruling that Miranda warnings apply to a
psychiatric exam to be used at death penalty sentencing).
29 See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (claim of constitutional error, normally
barred because of procedural default, can be heard if newly discovered evidence of fact exists
such that “no reasonable juror would have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”).
30 See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (announcing standard for
ineffective assistance).
31 See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (prosecutor’s comments constitute
violation if rendered sentencing fundamentally unfair).
32 See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998) (concluding that
clemency processes are subject to at least “minimal procedural safeguards” of Due Process).
33 To provide examples of how a case announcing a constitutional rule governing the death
penalty is then elaborated upon in numerous later cases might result in the longest footnote
in the history of law reviews. In fact, the Court’s capital decisionmaking could be used by
a mathematics teacher to illustrate the concept of exponential growth. To provide just one
example, the holding in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), invalidating the “wantonly
vile” aggravator as too vague, in turn begat Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988)
(concluding that “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” was too vague as applied); Shell v.
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring) (per curiam) (merely explaining that
“heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; atrocious means outrageously wicked and
vile; and cruel means to inflict a high degree of pain with indifference to, or even enjoyment
of[,] the suffering of others” does not adequately narrow terms); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639 (1990) (holding Arizona’s “heinous and cruel” aggravating circumstances constitutional
where limited to intended or foreseeable infliction of mental anguish or physical abuse”); and
Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993) (upholding an “utter disregard for human life” factor
as constitutional when interpreted as meaning a “cold-blooded, pitiless slayer”). This process
of elaboration has been repeated for almost every case the Court has decided.
34 536 U.S. 304 (2002). In keeping with the changing terminology as used by mental
health professionals, this Article will use the term “intellectually disabled” rather than
“mentally retarded” unless “mentally retarded” is the phrase used in a quotation. See Hall v.
Florida 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (“Previous opinions of this Court have employed the term
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Roper v. Simmons,35 the cases that struck down the death penalty for intellectually
disabled and juvenile defendants. While those cases have been properly heralded as
important holdings under the Court’s continuing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
that has found the death penalty “disproportional” for certain types of defendants and
crimes, it turns out that their holdings also contain reasoning with the potential for a
far greater impact on the death penalty. Indeed, this Article will show that, properly
understood, the cases are less about proportionality and more about a different line of
cases, a series of holdings that have focused on individualized sentencing and the need
for heightened reliability in capital sentencing. Looked at from this perspective, Atkins
and Roper are anything but conventional Eighth Amendment proportionality cases,
and instead involve the Court acknowledging for the first time that certain types of
mitigation are simply beyond the ken of the capital sentencer.
This acknowledgment, which we will call the “unreliability principle,” has
profound implications for the death penalty if applied honestly in future cases. At
a minimum, the cases call into serious question the death penalty for other offenders
where the unreliability principle applies, such as the category of mentally ill defen-
dants.36 And if taken to its logical endpoint, the unreliability principle simply cannot
“mental retardation.” This opinion uses the term “intellectual disability” to describe the
identical phenomenon.”).
35 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
36 Strong arguments have been made that Atkins’s and Roper’s reasoning requires a finding
that the death penalty cannot be applied to the mentally ill. These arguments tend to be focused
on Atkins and Roper as proportionality cases and the lack of a legitimate retributive or deterrent
effect in applying the death penalty to mentally ill defendants. See, e.g., Bethany C. Bryant,
Comment, Expanding Atkins and Roper: A Diagnostic Approach to Excluding the Death
Penalty as Punishment for Schizophrenic Offenders, 78 MISS. L.J. 905, 911–12 (2009)
(discussing the Court’s approach to the principle of proportionality and arguing that the death
penalty for mentally ill defendants could not advance the penological goal of deterrence);
Laurie T. Izutsu, Applying Atkins v. Virginia to Capital Defendants with Severe Mental
Illness, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 995, 999–1000 (2005) (noting that the Court has found the death
penalty has little deterrent effect against defendants with reduced capacity for reasoned
choice); Helen Shin, Is the Death of the Death Penalty Near? The Impact of Atkins and
Roper on the Future of Capital Punishment for Mentally Ill Defendants, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 465, 477–78, 480–81 (2007) (discussing how excessive punishments are judged by cur-
rently prevailing standards and how defendants with diminished capacity are not likely to be
deterred); Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence:
Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785 (2009) (discussing how the
death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for defendants with mental illness because
it does not meet the penological goals of retribution and deterrence).
Professor Christopher Slobogin has made important arguments using Equal Protection
and Due Process principles to expand Atkins to mentally ill defendants. See Christopher
Slobogin, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 24 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP.
667 (2000) (discussing the death penalty for the mentally ill through the lens of equal pro-
tection and due process); Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with
Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L. REV. 293 (2003) [hereinafter Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean]
(2003) (viewing Atkins through the lens of an Equal Protection argument). For a comprehensive
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be reconciled with the very premise that underlies the Court’s efforts to construct
a constitutional death penalty: the premise that the death penalty decision can be a
rational decision-making process while still fully considering the capital defendant
as an individual.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE “UNRELIABILITY PRINCIPLE”
A. The Conventional Account: Atkins and Roper as Proportionality Cases
The Court’s zig-zagging death penalty jurisprudence is on full display when look-
ing at the Court’s cases addressing the constitutionality of applying the death penalty
to intellectually disabled and juvenile defendants. In holding that intellectually disabled
defendants are beyond the death penalty’s reach, Atkins came a mere thirteen years,
barely a blink of an eye in constitutional time, after the Court in Penry v. Lynaugh37
had rejected the very same claim.38 And Roper constituted only a slightly longer Eighth
Amendment about-face, removing juveniles from death-penalty eligibility sixteen
years after the Court had declined to do so in Stanford v. Kentucky.39 Given that the
Court’s Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence is premised on the notion
of “evolving standards of decency,”40 the relative brevity of time suggests that the
two cases are not simply new branches on the Eighth Amendment evolutionary tree,
but represent a significant development in the very course of evolution in the death
penalty area.
This change in evolutionary course is not self-evident upon first reading Atkins
and Roper. The Court appears to simply follow the established framework for
looking at whether a category of cases violates the Eighth Amendment because the
punishment is so disproportionate that it “violates evolving standards of decency.”41
bibliography on materials regarding mental illness and the death penalty, see Jean Mattimoe,
The Death Penalty and the Mentally Ill: A Selected and Annotated Bibliography, 5 CRITICAL
LEGAL STUD. J. 1 (2012).
37 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
38 See generally id. (holding that a death sentence imposed on an intellectually disabled
defendant was not a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment).
39 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
40 Id. (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
41 The doctrinal roots of the Eighth Amendment principle that a punishment must be propor-
tional traces to a 1910 case where the Court held “that it is a precept of justice that punish-
ment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.” Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (striking down the punishment of cadena temporal, hard labor in chains,
for the crime of falsifying records). Chief Justice Warren first tied the Eighth Amendment
into an “evolving standards” analysis when he stated in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 100–01,
“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man. . . . The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”
494 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:487
Since approving in 1976 the “guided discretion”42 death penalty schemes that pur-
ported to cure the arbitrariness identified in Furman,43 the Court has utilized a two-
step process in assessing whether any specific category of capital cases violates
“evolving standards.” In the first step, the Court looks to “objective factors” such
as legislative trends, the number of death sentences imposed, and executions carried
out, to see if a consensus has emerged against the practice.44 After undertaking the
first step and giving the objective evidence “great importance,”45 the Court takes a
second step in which “the Constitution contemplates that in the end [the Court’s] own
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death
penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”46 Under this second step, the Court looks at
whether the death penalty would fulfill the penological purposes of retribution and
deterrence and, therefore, if “there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached
by the citizenry and its legislators.”47 Leading up to Atkins and Roper, the Court had
used the proportionality principle to bar the death penalty from being applied to crimes
such as non-homicidal rape and simple felony murder.48
And it was to this familiar two-step formula that the Court turned in Atkins and
Roper. In applying the first step in Atkins, Justice Stevens explained that a look at
“objective factors” showed that a “dramatic shift in the state legislative landscape . . .
ha[d] occurred” since Penry, and that a public sentiment against executing the intel-
lectually disabled had emerged.49 In Roper, Justice Kennedy looked to “the rejection
42 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197 (1976) (upholding Georgia’s new statutory
scheme as adequately guiding the jury in its exercise of discretion).
43 Most states used the Model Penal Code as a blueprint to hammer together “guided
discretion” statutes that attempted to meet Furman’s critique. These statutes tried to constrain
sentencer discretion by specifying certain “aggravating factors” that had to be found before a
defendant became eligible for the death penalty (for example, that the killing was of a police
officer during the course of her duties), and by then requiring the aggravating factors to be
weighed against mitigating factors that also were often specified in the statute. See generally
Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided
Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1152–53 (1991) (examining the
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in relation to guided discretion statutes).
44 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–14 (2002).
45 Id. at 312.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 313.
48 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding the death penalty unconsti-
tutional for felony-murder where the defendant neither kills nor knew death was highly likely
to occur); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding the death penalty invalid for rape
of an adult without murder). The Court also had held that the Eighth Amendment barred
executing a condemned defendant who did not understand “the punishment [he is] about to
suffer and why [he is] about to suffer it.” Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986). An
individual under Ford, however, would have been sentenced to death for a crime for which
he could be executed were it not for later becoming mentally incompetent.
49 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310–12.
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of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of its use . . . ;
and the consistency in the trend toward abolition” to find that “today our society views
juveniles” as “‘categorically less culpable than the average criminal.’”50 While the
dissenters took issue with how the majorities in Atkins and Roper took the nation’s
pulse to see if a consensus existed,51 on the whole the examination of the “objective
factors” was in line with the Court’s prior disproportionality analysis.
Pursuant to its precedent, the Court next “exercise[d] . . . [its] own independent
judgment” under the second step by looking at whether the death penalty served capi-
tal punishment’s retributive and deterrent purposes. In Atkins, the majority concluded
that, retributively, intellectually disabled individuals did not possess the culpability
necessary to place them among “the narrow category” of those “most deserving” of
the death penalty.52 Moreover, their impairments meant that they could not engage in
the “cold calculus” necessary for a punishment to have a deterrent effect.53 In Roper,
Justice Kennedy followed the same analytical path in concluding that juveniles’
immaturity meant that they “cannot with reliability be classified among the worst
offenders,”54 and that “‘[t]he likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind
of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so
remote as to be virtually nonexistent.’”55 Based on the classic two-step “evolving
standards” analysis, each majority opinion thus concluded that the death penalty was
a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
B. The “Unreliability Principle” Gets a Foothold: The Additional Analytical
Step in Atkins and Roper
If Atkins’s analysis had concluded at this point as in prior proportionality cases, the
opinion would have added by accretion to the Court’s body of “evolving standards”
case law, but would not have broken any new constitutional analytical ground. Justice
Stevens, however, did not stop there, but proceeded to offer an additional “justification”
to the conventional two-step analysis:
The risk “that the death penalty will be imposed [on intellectually
disabled defendants] in spite of factors which may call for a less
severe penalty,” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978), is
50 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005) (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316).
51 The Atkins dissenters, for instance, objected to the majority’s reliance on opinion polls
and the views of professional organizations. 536 U.S. at 322–23 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
In Roper, the dissent objected to the majority’s references to the rarity of the juvenile death
penalty among other nations. 543 U.S. at 626–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
53 Id. at 319–20.
54 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569, 589.
55 Id. at 572 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988) (plurality opinion)).
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enhanced, not only by the possibility of false confessions, but
also by the lesser ability of mentally retarded defendants to make
a persuasive showing of mitigation in the face of prosecutorial
evidence of one or more aggravating factors. Mentally retarded
defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their
counsel and are typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor
may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for
their crimes. . . . [M]oreover, reliance on mental retardation as
a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance
the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerous-
ness will be found by the jury. [Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
323–25 (1989)] Mentally retarded defendants in the aggregate
face a special risk of wrongful execution.56
While the full meaning of this justification will be unpacked in detail later,57 this addi-
tional justification planted the seed of a very powerful Eighth Amendment concept
that this Article calls the “unreliability principle”: if too great a risk exists that consti-
tutionally protected mitigation cannot be properly comprehended and accounted for
by the sentencer, the unreliability that is created means that the death penalty cannot
be constitutionally applied.
Perhaps if the Court had not returned to the idea, the unreliability principle would
have remained a nascent idea lying dormant in Atkins’s holding. The Court, however,
invoked the principle again but three years later in Roper. In Roper, the State had
argued in part that a categorical ban on the death penalty for juveniles was unneces-
sary because jurors already were allowed to take youth into account as a mitigating
circumstance on a case-by-case basis.58 In rejecting this argument for the majority,
Justice Kennedy again invoked the idea that the mitigation at stake was beyond the
sentencer’s ken, arguing that the very nature of a capital crime made it almost impos-
sible for a jury to properly assess the mitigating circumstance:
An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-
blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigat-
ing arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where
the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, vulnerability, and
lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe than
death. In some cases a defendant’s youth may even be counted
against him. In this very case, as we noted above, the prosecutor
argued Simmons’ youth was aggravating rather than mitigating.59
56 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21 (footnote omitted).
57 See infra notes 102–26 and accompanying text.
58 Roper, 543 U.S. at 572.
59 Id. at 573.
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Importantly, the Court further elaborated that while theoretically it might be possible
to add yet another rule requiring jurors to be instructed to consider youth as mitiga-
tion, any such piecemeal fix could not ensure sufficient reliability:
While this sort of overreaching could be corrected by a particular
rule to ensure that the mitigating force of youth is not overlooked,
that would not address our larger concerns. It is difficult even for
expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile of-
fender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity,
and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption. As we understand it, this difficulty underlies the rule
forbidding psychiatrists from diagnosing any patient under 18 as
having antisocial personality disorder, a disorder also referred to
as psychopathy or sociopathy, and which is characterized by cal-
lousness, cynicism, and contempt for the feelings, rights, and
suffering of others. If trained psychiatrists with the advantage of
clinical testing and observation refrain, despite diagnostic exper-
tise, from assessing any juvenile under 18 as having antisocial
personality disorder, we conclude that States should refrain from
asking jurors to issue a far graver condemnation—that a juvenile
offender merits the death penalty. When a juvenile offender com-
mits a heinous crime, the State can exact forfeiture of some of the
most basic liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his life and his
potential to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity.60
Roper thus strongly reinforced Atkins’s recognition that if circumstances prevent
a juror from being able to give proper consideration to constitutionally protected
mitigation, the death penalty categorically cannot be imposed. And here is the
interesting aspect of Atkins and Roper’s recognition of the unreliability principle:
while on the one hand this principle constitutes a significant new development in
Eighth Amendment law, the principle itself has roots deeply imbedded in the
Court’s constitutional doctrine. Indeed, by taking a step back and looking at the
unreliability principle’s place in the overall constitutional scheme, one can see that
the principle is but a natural step in the evolution of the Court’s Eighth Amendment
doctrine. The key to understanding this evolution, however, is to look at Atkins and
Roper not as proportionality cases, but, rather, as the logical and inevitable progres-
sion of a different line of Eighth Amendment cases, the Court’s requirement that the
death penalty only be imposed after a sentencer has given a defendant full “individ-
ualized consideration.”61
60 Id. at 573–74 (citations omitted).
61 Id. at 572.
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C. The History: Individualized Consideration as the Guarantor of Reliability
On the same day in 1976 that the Court approved guided discretion schemes in
Gregg v. Georgia,62 the method by which most states attempted to address arbitrari-
ness by listing aggravating and mitigating factors for the jury to weigh,63 the Court
struck down the mandatory death penalty. Several states, like Louisiana and North
Carolina, had responded to Furman by abolishing discretion all together and man-
dating the death penalty for certain capital crimes.64 In ruling such efforts unconsti-
tutional in Woodson v. North Carolina, Justice Stewart’s plurality opinion laid out
the Eighth Amendment principle of individualized consideration:
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the
character and record of the individual offender or the circum-
stances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in
fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of com-
passionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frail-
ties of humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a designated
offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members
of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind
infliction of the penalty of death. . . .
[W]e believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for hu-
manity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consider-
ation of the character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indis-
pensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.
This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty of
death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long.65
Woodson along with its companion case of Roberts v. Louisiana,66 thus not only al-
lowed but required as a constitutional rule the consideration of “the possibility of com-
passionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind,”67
62 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
63 See supra note 43 (examining states’ response to Furman).
64 See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 329 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 286 (1976).
65 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304–05 (citation omitted).
66 428 U.S. 325 (holding Louisiana’s mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional).
67 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
2014] THE TRUE LEGACY OF ATKINS AND ROPER 499
an elegiac command of law not often seen in a profession accustomed to thinking
in terms of dryly stated rules.68
The full scope of Woodson and Roberts’s constitutional imperative of “individ-
ualized consideration” was not made clear until two years later in Lockett v. Ohio.69
In Lockett, the Court addressed Ohio’s “guided discretion” statute that limited the
capital sentencer’s consideration of mitigating factors to a list of only three circum-
stances.70 Ohio had argued that the limited list of mitigators was its effort to comply
with Furman by guiding the sentencer’s discretion not only as to what factors made
the defendant eligible for death, but also as to those that could be considered as weigh-
ing against the death sentence.71 The Lockett Court, however, ruled that limiting what
mitigating factors could be considered was irreconcilable with the necessity of al-
lowing individualized consideration before an individual could be sentenced to death.72
As a result, Lockett issued a broad constitutional mandate that the sentencer must be
allowed to consider “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death.”73
Lockett was to have a profound impact on capital sentencing. The requirement that
the jury be allowed to consider “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record . . .
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death”74 has led to a
wide variety of mitigation being presented to juries. Evidence ranges from evidence
documenting the hardships and impairments that the defendant has faced in his life-
time, such as child abuse, to evidence aimed at demonstrating to the sentencer that the
defendant will function well in prison if given a life sentence.75 And while the Court’s
68 Imagine, for instance, how such a holding might be placed in a capital punishment
treatise’s index by a professional indexer unfamiliar with death penalty law: “Well, of course
I cross-indexed it under ‘compassion’ and ‘diverse human frailties,’ where else would you
have had me put it?”
69 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
70 As the Lockett Court explained,
Once a verdict of aggravated murder with specifications had been re-
turned, the Ohio death penalty statute required the trial judge to impose
a death sentence unless, after “considering the nature and circumstances
of the offense” and Lockett’s “history, character, and condition,” he found
by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the victim had induced or
facilitated the offense, (2) it was unlikely that Lockett would have
committed the offense but for the fact that she “was under duress,
coercion, or strong provocation,” or (3) the offense was “primarily the
product of [Lockett’s] psychosis or mental deficiency.”
Id. at 593–94 (alteration in original).
71 Id. at 599–600 n.7.
72 Id. at 606.
73 Id. at 604 (emphasis added).
74 Id.
75 See generally Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams
in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (2008).
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standard for ineffective assistance of counsel still lags behind the realities of capital
representation, the Court has begrudgingly come to recognize that a thorough inves-
tigation of a capital defendant’s life history is required.76
Lockett’s long-term importance, however, lay not only in how it affected court-
room practice, but also in its rationale. In justifying the holding’s expansive definition
of mitigation, the Court explicitly tied together the need for full consideration of
mitigating evidence with the requirement of heightened reliability in capital cases.
The Lockett majority began by holding that capital sentencing “call[ed] for a greater
degree of reliability” because “the penalty of death is qualitatively different from any
other sentence.”77 Crucially, the Court then expressly linked the heightened reliability
with Woodson’s requirement of individualized consideration:
Given that the imposition of death by public authority is so pro-
foundly different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the
conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital
cases. . . . The nonavailability of corrective or modifying mecha-
nisms with respect to an executed capital sentence underscores
the need for individualized consideration as a constitutional re-
quirement in imposing the death sentence.78
And, the Court observed, the need for greater reliability based on individualized
consideration means that a death sentence cannot stand if the sentencing carried the
“risk” that the sentencer did not fully hear or consider mitigation:
[P]revent[ing] the sentencer in all capital cases from giving in-
dependent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s char-
acter and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in
mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed
in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty.
76 See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39 (2009) (“It is unquestioned that under the pre-
vailing professional norms at the time of Porter’s trial, counsel had an ‘obligation to conduct a
thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.’” (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 396 (2000))).
77 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court elaborated,
“The need for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree
of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more important
than in noncapital cases. A variety of flexible techniques—probation,
parole, work furloughs, to name a few—and various postconviction
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When the choice is between life and death, that risk is unac-
ceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.79
This strong embracing of individualized consideration as the linchpin to reliability
thus placed the focal point of the Eighth Amendment squarely on the sentencer’s
ability (or inability) to consider constitutionally mandated mitigating evidence.
The Court cemented the constitutional relationship between individualized con-
sideration and reliability in a number of subsequent cases. In Eddings v. Oklahoma,80
the Court reversed a death sentence where the lower courts had believed that they
were not allowed to consider a defendant’s troubled youth as mitigation.81 In explain-
ing Woodson and Lockett’s mandates of individualized consideration of mitigation, the
Court elaborated on the principle’s importance by stressing that not only is individu-
alized consideration essential for the reliability of a death sentence for a particular
defendant, but individualized consideration is a crucial part of satisfying Furman’s
overall command that death sentences throughout the capital punishment system be
consistent: “By holding that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to con-
sider any relevant mitigating factor, the rule in Lockett recognizes that a consistency
produced by ignoring individual differences is a false consistency.”82 Without reliable
individualized consideration, the capital punishment system as a whole creates an
unacceptable risk of reverting to the arbitrariness and capriciousness that brought
the system down in Furman v. Georgia.83
The link between the principle of individualized consideration and the reliability
necessary to satisfy Furman also formed a critical part of the Court’s rationale in
Skipper v. South Carolina.84 In Skipper, the trial court had excluded testimony that
the defendant had exhibited good behavior in his seven months while in jail awaiting
trial.85 With a hint of impatience, the majority noted that “there is no disputing” that
it is “now well established” that the defendant has the constitutional right to have
“any relevant mitigating evidence” considered.86 And the majority had no trouble
79 Id. (emphasis added).
80 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
81 Id. at 109, 117.
82 Id. at 112.
83 Id.
84 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
85 Id. at 3.
86 Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court showed similar impatience in
striking down a Florida death sentence where the trial court had viewed itself as limited to a list
of statutory mitigating factors. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987). Hitchcock
evidences how entrenched Lockett had become by this point. After the Court found that the
record made clear that the judge had viewed himself as limited to only statutory mitigating
factors, Justice Scalia for a unanimous Court treated the finding as constitutional game, set,
and match:
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finding that “a defendant’s disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjust-
ment to life in prison is itself an aspect of his character that is by its nature relevant
to the sentencing determination.”87 As in Eddings, the Skipper Court further explained
that the specific mitigating evidence at stake also worked to make the capital sentencing
system as a whole more reliable: “Consideration of a defendant’s past conduct as in-
dicative of his probable future behavior is an inevitable and not undesirable element
of criminal sentencing . . . .”88 In fact, the Court drew a direct parallel to its earlier
approval of “future dangerousness” as a legitimate aggravating factor because “‘any
sentencing authority must predict a convicted person’s probable future conduct when
it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose.’”89
The case, though, that perhaps most firmly wedded the principle of individualized
responsibility with the need for reliability was Penry v. Lynaugh.90 In Penry, the
defendant had introduced evidence of his intellectual disability, but under Texas’s
capital punishment scheme at the time, the jury had no legal way to give consideration
to his condition.91 Under the Texas scheme, the jury had simply been asked three
questions: “Did Penry act deliberately when he murdered Pamela Carpenter? Is there
a probability that he will be dangerous in the future? Did he act unreasonably in re-
sponse to provocation?”92 If the jury answered “yes” to all three questions, they were
to return a death sentence; if they answered “no” to one or more questions, they were
to return a verdict of life.93
Given the nature of the three questions, however, the jury had no meaningful way
to give effect to Penry’s evidence of intellectual disability. Indeed, because the evi-
dence was that his impairment meant he had poor impulse control, if anything, his
mitigating evidence made it more likely that the jury would answer “yes” to the second
question of whether he posed a future danger.94 Because intellectual disability was
undeniably mitigating evidence under Lockett, and because the jury had no “vehicle”
We think it could not be clearer that the advisory jury was instructed
not to consider, and the sentencing judge refused to consider, evidence
of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, and that the proceedings
therefore did not comport with the requirements of Skipper v. South
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982),
and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 398–99.
87 Skipper, 476 U.S. at 7.
88 Id. at 5.
89 Id. (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.)).
90 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
91 Id. at 312.
92 Id. at 320.
93 Id. at 310.
94 The prosecutor, in fact, argued to the jury that Penry’s psychiatric history made him
a danger in prison. Id. at 323–24 (quoting prosecutor’s closing argument).
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through which it could have given effect to the mitigation, the Court reversed Penry’s
death sentence.95
Especially important, however, for the evolution of the unreliability principle
was the opinion’s express tying together of the Woodson-Lockett individualized
consideration requirement with the need for reliability.96 Justice O’Connor’s major-
ity opinion traced in step-by-step detail the Court’s evolving precedent. The opinion
began with the Court’s now obligatory observation that individualized consideration
was bedrock Eighth Amendment doctrine.97 Next, the opinion emphasized the lesson
of Eddings that “it is not enough simply to allow the defendant to present mitigating
evidence to the sentencer[; t]he sentencer must also be able to consider and give
effect to that evidence in imposing sentence.”98 Finally, the opinion explained that
the full presentation and consideration of mitigation was constitutionally essential,
and it was essential because of reliability:
Only then can we be sure that the sentencer has treated the de-
fendant as a “uniquely individual human bein[g]” and has made
a reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence.
[Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 305 (1976)].
“Thus, the sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect
a reasoned moral response to the defendant’s background, char-
acter, and crime.”99
And just in case the link between individualized consideration and reliability had
not been made abundantly clear, the opinion forcefully returned to the theme later
in rejecting the state’s argument that allowing the jury to consider broad mitigation
would cast the system back into the unfettered discretion that Furman condemned:
95 Id. at 328.
96 Id.
97 The opinion explained that “[u]nderlying Lockett and Eddings is the principle that
punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant”
and that such “individualized assessment” turns upon the “defendant’s background and
character.” Id. at 319.
98 Id. (emphasis added).
99 Id. (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O’Connor first coined the phrase “reasoned moral response” in a case that initially
might appear at odds with the evolutionary theme of broad mitigation. She invoked the concept
as a way of explaining why an “anti-sympathy” instruction at the penalty phase did not under-
mine Lockett’s mandate of broad mitigation. Brown, 479 U.S. at 545 (arguing such an instruc-
tion did not violate the Eighth Amendment because mitigation was meant to be evaluated as
a “reasoned moral response” rather than an emotional or sympathetic response). The idea of
a “reasoned moral response,” however, is quite congruous with the idea that individualized
consideration is crucial to reliability, since a sentencer cannot begin to have a “reasoned,”
let alone a “moral,” response unless she is in possession of complete information about the
defendant and personally capable of considering it.
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[I]t is precisely because the punishment should be directly related
to the personal culpability of the defendant that the jury must be
allowed to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence relevant
to a defendant’s character or record or the circumstances of the
offense. Rather than creating the risk of an unguided emotional
response, full consideration of evidence that mitigates against
the death penalty is essential if the jury is to give a “‘reasoned
moral response to the defendant’s background, character, and
crime.’ “In order to ensure “reliability in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case,” the jury
must be able to consider and give effect to any mitigating evi-
dence relevant to a defendant’s background and character or the
circumstances of the crime.
In this case, in the absence of instructions informing the jury that
it could consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of
Penry’s mental retardation and abused background by declining
to impose the death penalty, we conclude that the jury was not
provided with a vehicle for expressing its “reasoned moral re-
sponse” to that evidence in rendering its sentencing decision.
Our reasoning in Lockett and Eddings thus compels a remand for
resentencing so that we do not “risk that the death penalty will
be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe
penalty.” “When the choice is between life and death, that risk
is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”100
Thus through a series of cases that relentlessly hammered the point home, the
Court sent the unambiguous message that the Eighth Amendment right to individual-
ized consideration was to be construed broadly because it was a critical underpinning
of the Court’s efforts to construct a constitutional death penalty system after Furman.101
100 Penry, 492 U.S. at 327–28 (citations omitted); see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S.
782, 797 (2001) (Penry II) (describing the “give effect to” language of the other Penry case
as “the key” to that decision).
101 A bit astonishingly, given the clear mandate of the Lockett line of cases through Penry,
the Court still had to clarify the point for the Fifth Circuit in the case of Tennard v. Dretke,
542 U.S. 274 (2004). The Fifth Circuit had upheld the Texas courts’ and lower federal court’s
finding that the inability of the jury to give effect to the defendant’s evidence that he had an
IQ of 67 was not sufficient to warrant a certificate of appealability. Id. at 279–81. The Fifth
Circuit had imposed a threshold requirement requiring mitigating evidence to be “‘constitu-
tionally relevant’ . . . that is, evidence of a ‘uniquely severe permanent handicap with which
the defendant was burdened through no fault of his own,’ and evidence that ‘the criminal act
was attributable to this severe permanent condition.’” Id. at 281 (quoting the Fifth Circuit
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And it is within this line of cases that Atkins can be seen as adding a critical further
elaboration on the underlying principle of reliability and individualized consideration.
D. The Unreliability Principle: The Next Step in the Precedent
That Atkins constitutes an important development in the Woodson-Lockett line of
cases may at first seem odd since it arose through an Eighth Amendment dispro-
portionality challenge. Upon reflection, however, it makes sense that Atkins would
be the case to give voice to the principle that the death penalty categorically cannot
be imposed if too great a risk exists that constitutionally protected mitigation will not
be properly comprehended and accounted for by the sentencer.
Prior to Atkins, the Court had not been forced to directly face the deep systemic
question of whether juries could adequately assess intellectual disability as mitiga-
tion. It is true that the Court in Penry had suggested that a categorical ban on the
death penalty for intellectually disabled individuals was unnecessary in part because
a jury in any individual case could take into account the defendant’s intellectual
disability as mitigation.102 And, as we have seen, this rationale actually produced an
opinion in Penry that resoundingly sang Woodson and Lockett’s praises and strongly
reinforced the constitutional requirement that a sentencer must be able to give effect
to mitigation for a death sentence to be constitutionally reliable. But because the
Court reversed Penry’s death sentence since the Texas three-question scheme at the
time did not adequately allow the jury to give effect to his evidence of intellectual
disability,103 the Penry Court never had to directly confront the deeper systemic
question: what if the very nature of the intellectual disability meant that the senten-
cer might not be able to properly assess how the mitigation affected the defendant’s
moral culpability sentence and precluded a reliable assessment?
In Atkins the Court could no longer avoid the systemic question. As in Penry,
the State was arguing that no need for a categorical ban existed because a jury in an
individual case could consider intellectual disability as mitigation, and the Virginia
system, unlike the Texas scheme, did not preclude its consideration.104 The Atkins
Court was thus forced to confront the larger reliability question, and, as we know,
determined that an assessment of an intellectually disabled individual’s culpability
is beyond a jury’s ken. Given the Court’s repeated mantra from Woodson through
Penry and beyond that the death penalty is not constitutionally acceptable unless
there is reliable individualized consideration, the Court could reach no other logical
opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court made clear that the Fifth
Circuit’s restrictive standard “has no foundation in the decisions of this Court,” and, in fact,
was contrary to the Court’s cases, which had always spoken of mitigation in the “most ex-
pansive terms.” Id. at 284.
102 492 U.S. at 340.
103 See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
104 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320–21 (2002).
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conclusion: if a reliable assessment of constitutionally protected mitigation lies beyond
the jury’s ability, the jurors cannot even be asked to consider a death sentence.
It was through these circumstances, then, that Atkins took its place as the latest
chapter in the Court’s line of Woodson-Lockett individualized consideration cases.
Consequently, far from residing solely in the Court’s line of proportionality cases,
Atkins also became an important part of the Court’s “individualized consideration”
precedent by recognizing that where mitigation defied reliable assessment, the only con-
stitutional answer was a categorical removal of those cases from the death penalty.
Roper took this melding of proportionality and individualized consideration yet
a step further as the Court even more explicitly linked its Eighth Amendment ban
on the juvenile death penalty with the unreliability of the sentencer’s capability to
assess youth as mitigation.105 As noted earlier, the Court observed that while one re-
sponse might be to craft yet another rule to try and spot fix the unreliability,106 such
an effort would be doomed to failure: “If trained psychiatrists with the advantage of
clinical testing and observation refrain, despite diagnostic expertise, from assessing
any juvenile under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, we conclude that
States should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver condemnation—that a
juvenile offender merits the death penalty.”107 To the Court’s credit, once it determined
that jurors were unable to reliably assess how juvenile status affected a defendant’s
culpability, the Court acknowledged that the unreliability required categorical exclu-
sion rather than attempting to affix yet another procedural patch. And in coming to
that recognition, the Court expressly invoked Lockett’s individualized consideration
language as it concluded that the risk that the death penalty will be imposed on juve-
niles in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty was simply too great
to allow the death penalty to be decided by the jury.108
With Atkins and Roper, therefore, the discourse on individualized consideration
re-entered the Court’s Eighth Amendment dialogue with renewed vigor. That the
Court’s reliance on the unreliability principle in Atkins and Roper would not be iso-
lated instances became evident when the Court next invoked it in the non-capital case
of Graham v. Florida.109 In striking down life without parole sentences for juveniles
105 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
106 “While this sort of overreaching [of the prosecutor arguing youth as an aggravator]
could be corrected by a particular rule to ensure that the mitigating force of youth is not over-
looked, that would not address our larger concerns.” Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 572–73.
109 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). Professor Richard Bierschbach has written an excellent piece
arguing that Graham is more of an individualized-consideration case than a proportionality
case in a manner that is very compatible with this Article’s reading. Richard A. Bierschbach,
Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1745 (2012). Because he is primarily
focused on how parole plays a role in fulfilling the requirement of individualized consid-
eration, he does not view Atkins and Roper as having a similar connection to Woodson and
Lockett. Id. at 1749, 1766–67 (“Parole thus conceptually severs Graham from Roper, Atkins,
and other classic proportionality cases . . . .”). Once the unreliability principle of Atkins and
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who had committed nonhomicide crimes, the Court invoked the unreliability principle
to reject the idea that the states could rely on a “case-by-case proportionality” ap-
proach to decide if a life without parole sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.110
Specifically, the Graham Court brought the unreliability principle into play by turn-
ing to Atkins and Roper’s theme that the very nature of the mitigation rendered an
assessment of the defendant’s culpability unreliable:
[T]he features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them
at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings. Juveniles
mistrust adults and have limited understandings of the criminal
justice system and the roles of the institutional actors within it.
They are less likely than adults to work effectively with their
lawyers to aid in their defense. Difficulty in weighing long-term
consequences; a corresponding impulsiveness; and reluctance to
trust defense counsel seen as part of the adult world a rebellious
youth rejects, all can lead to poor decisions by one charged with
a juvenile offense. These factors are likely to impair the quality
of a juvenile defendant’s representation.111
The Court concluded that these “special difficulties” meant that the risk was simply
too great that the sentencer would not be able to reliably assess how any particular
juvenile defendant might act in the future:
For even if we were to assume that some juvenile nonhomicide
offenders might have “sufficient psychological maturity, and at the
same time demonstrate sufficient depravity” to merit a life with-
out parole sentence, it does not follow that courts taking a case-
by-case proportionality approach could with sufficient accuracy
distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many
that have the capacity for change.
Roper is recognized, however, Graham in fact becomes a conceptual extension of Atkins and
Roper, rather than a severance, through its recognition that no procedural rule can guarantee
sufficient reliability in the context of life without parole for juveniles. See also Richard A.
Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment, 112 MICH. L. REV.
397 (2013) (drawing connection between Graham, Miller, Apprendi, and Woodson-Lockett);
Janet C. Hoeffel, The Jurisprudence of Death and Youth: Now the Twain Should Meet, 46
TEX. TECH L. REV. 29, 51–53 (2013) (drawing connection between Graham, Miller, and
Woodson-Lockett).
110 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. The case-by-case approach was advocated by Chief Justice
Roberts in his concurrence. Id. at 2037 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
111 Id. at 2032 (internal citation omitted). The majority at this point provided a “cf.”
citation to Atkins. Id. (“Cf. Atkins, 536 U.S., at 320, 122 S. Ct. at 2242 (“Mentally retarded
defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel”)”).
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. . . A categorical rule [barring life without parole sentences thus]
avoids the risk that, as a result of these difficulties, a court or jury
will erroneously conclude that a particular juvenile is sufficiently
culpable to deserve life without parole for a non-homicide.112
The Graham Court’s categorical exclusion of juveniles who committed nonhomicide
crimes from a sentence of life without parole thus relied on the Eighth Amendment
unreliability principle and the danger that such a severe sentence might be errone-
ously imposed because of the sentencer’s inability to make a reliable assessment on
a case-by-case basis.113
And although the unreliability principle was not directly at issue in Hall v.
Florida,114 the case in which the Court struck down Florida’s rule that Atkins could
not apply unless a defendant had an IQ test of 70 or under, the Court expressly ac-
knowledged “protect[ion] [of] the integrity of the trial process” as one of Atkins’s
key rationales.115 Moreover, the Hall opinion revolved around the idea that because
112 Id. (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). The Graham majority addition-
ally observed that barring life without parole“gives all juvenile non-homicide offenders a chance
to demonstrate maturity and reform.” Id. Although not as self-evident, this justification also
ties into the unreliability principle, because it highlights the inability to predict in the future
whether the defendant might in fact change:
Life in prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance for ful-
fillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society,
no hope. Maturity can lead to that considered reflection which is the
foundation for remorse, renewal and rehabilitation . . . A categorical
rule against life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders
avoids the perverse consequence in which the lack of maturity that led to
an offender’s crime is reinforced by the prison term.
Id. at 2032–33.
113 In the next juvenile defendant case, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), the
Court expressly invoked the Woodson-Lockett line of individualized sentencing cases. The
sentence at issue was a mandatory sentence of life without parole for a juvenile convicted
of homicide, making, as the Court noted, “relevant . . . a second line of our precedents,
demanding individualized sentencing when imposing the death penalty.” Miller, 132 S. Ct.
at 2467. The Court’s opinion is important for expressly importing the Woodson-Lockett line
of cases into a non-capital context, but because the sentence was mandatory, the Court was
able to strike down the mandatory nature of the life without parole sentence without ad-
dressing underlying issues of unreliability in the discretionary setting. Indeed, because the
Court found that striking down the mandatory sentencing feature was “sufficient” to decide
the cases before it, they did not “consider [the petitioners’] alternative argument that the
Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar.” Id. at 2469. The Court then added that given
“children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacities for change, we think appropriate
occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.” Id.
114 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
115 Id. at 1993 (quoting Atkins as to the “special risks” that intellectually disabled defendants
face at trial and sentencing).
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Florida’s “rigid rule” of a hard cut-off of a 70 IQ ignored how medical professionals
use and understand the role of IQ tests, the state “create[d] an unacceptable risk that
persons with intellectual disability will be executed, and thus is unconstitutional.”116
Indeed, given that part of Atkins’s reasoning is that juries are not able to reliably
assess whether an intellectually disabled individual deserves the death penalty, it is hard
to see how the Court had any choice but to reassert constitutional control over how
the category of intellectual disability is defined. Otherwise, Florida, through its under-
inclusive definition of intellectual disability, would have once again been exposing
defendants who had the attributes that Atkins had singled out as creating “special risks
of wrongful execution” to the possibility of an erroneously imposed death sentence.117
E. The Next Step in the Evolution: The Effect of the Unreliability Principle
Once it is understood that Atkins and Roper are not in fact conventional propor-
tionality cases, their far broader impact on the Eighth Amendment and the death
penalty can be seen. Most fundamentally, the unreliability principle is not bound by
the first step of the “evolving standards” test that requires a finding of a “national
consensus” before the Court can proceed with its proportionality analysis.118 Rather,
116 Id. at 1990.
117 Whether or not deliberate, the majority’s manner of recounting the facts in Hall has
the rhetorical effect of making Atkins’s point about the dangers of erroneously imposed death
sentences on the intellectually disabled. After recounting Hall’s intellectual struggles from
childhood on through adulthood and how those interacting with him daily clearly viewed him
as intellectually disabled, Justice Kennedy notes, “Hall’s upbringing appeared to make his
deficits in adaptive functioning all the more severe.” Id. at 1991. The opinion then relates
“the most horrible family circumstances imaginable,” including how “retardation did not
garner any sympathy from his mother, but rather caused much scorn to befall him.” Id. Hall was
“[c]onstantly beaten because he was ‘slow’ or because he made simple
mistakes.” His mother “would strap [Hall] to his bed at night, with a
rope thrown over a rafter. In the morning, she would awaken Hall by
hoisting him up and whipping him with a belt, rope, or cord.” Hall was
beaten “ten or fifteen times a week sometimes.” His mother tied him
“in a ‘croaker’ sack, swung it over a fire, and beat him,” “buried him
in the sand up to his neck to ‘strengthen his legs,’ “ and “held a gun on
Hall . . . while she poked [him] with sticks.”
Id. at 1990 (alterations in original) (quoting from lower court opinions and findings).
After such a recounting, one is tempted to read Justice Kennedy’s next line, “The jury,
notwithstanding this testimony, voted to sentence Hall to death, and the sentencing court
adopted the jury’s recommendation,” id. at 1991 (emphasis added), as a tacit suggestion that
the Court got it right in Atkins, i.e., if this type of evidence could not persuade a jury to return
a life sentence, there simply is too great a “risk ‘that the death penalty will be imposed in
spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty.’” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
320 (quoting Lockett).
118 As noted earlier, supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text, under the Court’s con-
ventional proportionality analysis, the Court’s second step of an “independent” analysis
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because the unreliability principle is an expression of the Woodson-Lockett line of
cases rather than the evolving standards cases, the prerequisite of a national consen-
sus simply has no bearing on the constitutional inquiry. As has been recounted, the
Woodson-Lockett line of cases instituted the Eighth Amendment mandate that the
sentencer must be able to give effect to constitutionally protected mitigation because
it was a necessary “cure” to the arbitrariness Furman identified: without proper con-
sideration of mitigation, the death penalty is not sufficiently reliable to satisfy the
Eighth Amendment.119 This requirement, however, has no logical nexus to whether
or not a national consensus has coalesced about the mitigation. If a sentencer cannot
reliably give effect to the protected mitigation, the Court’s constitutional promise is
broken. The only question, therefore, is whether the challenged practice runs afoul of
the constitutional requirement that the sentencer be able to competently and reliably
make a “reasoned moral response.”
Once it is recognized that the Atkins-Roper unreliability principle is not tethered
to the “national consensus” requirement but stands on its own, the principle’s applica-
bility to other contexts becomes far more expansive. The principle’s application might
be thought of as occurring on two different levels. The first level involves identifying
other specific mitigating circumstances that pose the same dangers of unreliability as
intellectual disability and juvenile status. The second level entails using the unreliability
principle to mount a global investigation of whether our system of capital punishment
can in reality deliver death sentences only after a sentence has reliably given effect
to mitigating evidence.
This Article will attempt to sketch out the basic outlines of each of these appli-
cations of the unreliability principle. It will look at the first level by thinking about
how the uncertainty principle might apply to defendants suffering from serious mental
illness. A number of attempts have been made to extend Atkins and Roper to mentally
ill defendants through traditional proportionality analysis,120 but it is a difficult task
given the lack of a clear national consensus similar to what existed for intellectually
disabled and juvenile capital defendants. The unreliability principle, on the other hand,
presents a much stronger argument that the risk of a death sentence being errone-
ously imposed upon a mentally ill defendant simply is too great for the Constitution
to bear. Second, as a means of beginning to think about the global examination, the
Article will use findings concerning implicit bias to see how the unreliability principle
calls into question the entire framework of the Court’s post-Furman assumptions on
the reliability of the death penalty.
In undertaking this review, we can look at the three cases in which the Court has
utilized the unreliability principle—Atkins, Roper, and Graham—and identify six
follows a threshold inquiry of whether a national consensus has developed against a practice.
The first step is intended to provide “objective evidence” that the practice is excessive based
on evolving standards. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311–12.
119 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
120 See supra note 36.
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factors that the Court has used for flagging “special difficulties” that might place a
mitigating factor beyond a sentencer’s reliable evaluation. These factors, which we
will call the Atkins-Roper unreliability factors are: (1)where the mitigation impairs
the defendant’s cooperation with his lawyer and the lawyer’s ability to prepare a
defense;121 (2) where the mitigation makes the defendant into a “poor witness,” in
part because of the likelihood that their demeanor would make them appear to be
remorseless;122 (3) where the mitigation causes distortions in the defendant’s thinking
process that are likely to produce bad decisions;123 (4) when the mitigation has a double-
edged nature that poses the risk that it will be improperly turned into aggravation;124
(5) when the complexity and conflicting views of experts in the area are likely to gen-
erate confusion and misunderstanding among the jurors;125 and (6) when the risk that
the sheer “brutality” of the crime will preclude jurors from properly considering the
mitigation.126 And if those six criteria are applied to mentally ill defendants, each
factor could be recited almost verbatim with a cutting and pasting of “mentally ill
defendant” in for “intellectually disabled” in Atkins or “juvenile” defendant in Roper
and Graham.
II. CATEGORICAL EXCLUSIONS UNDER THE UNRELIABILITY PRINCIPLE AND
MENTALLY ILL DEFENDANTS
Among mitigating circumstances, mental illness is one of the most widely recog-
nized as a characteristic arguing for a sentence less than death. Serious mental illness
is a standard statutory mitigating factor in those states that list mitigators in their
capital punishment statute.127 States also often provide by statute for the appointment
of a mental health expert simply at the request of a capital defendant,128 and the
Supreme Court has recognized a combined due process–equal protection right to
appointment of a mental health expert as an “essential tool” of the defense where
mental health is at issue.129 The “best practices” of capital defendant attorneys require
a thorough mental health history and a scouring of the defendant’s past looking for
signs of mental illness as a basic prerequisite to building the defense’s “case for
121 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21; see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010).
122 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
123 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
124 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
125 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308–09.
126 Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
127 See Ellen Fels Berkman, Note, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in
Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 297–98 (1989) (detailing “[t]he high percentage
of statutory mitigating circumstances that have mental illness components”).
128 See VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-264.3:1 (West 2014).
129 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (defendant entitled to appointment of a psychiatrist
“when the State has made the defendant’s mental condition relevant to his criminal culpability
and to the punishment he might suffer”).
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life.”130 Over half of capital jurors identify a defendant’s “history of mental illness”
as making them less likely to give a death sentence, with more than a quarter of jurors
stating that it would make them “much less” likely.131
But while mental illness may be recognized in the abstract by jurors as a powerful
mitigator, the unreliability principle requires that the courts also ask if they can
reliably apply the mitigator in practice. Both intellectual disability and juvenile status,
after all, were a key part of any defense attorney’s preparation for the “case for life”
if they were present in the case. Moreover, like mental illness, capital jurors readily
identified a defendant’s intellectual disability and juvenile status as having a strong
mitigating effect.132 In fact, the only characteristic that jurors identified as even more
likely to sway them towards a life sentence than mental illness was intellectual dis-
ability, with almost three-quarters of jurors saying that it would make them less likely
to impose death.133 Jurors identified juvenile status as the fourth most likely charac-
teristic (following intellectual disability, mental illness, and lack of institutional help)
to sway them towards a life sentence.134 The problem in Atkins and Roper, as we have
seen, was that although everyone recognized that intellectual disability and youth
in the abstract were powerful mitigators, sentencers could not reliably evaluate them
in practice, creating the unacceptable risk of an erroneously imposed death sentence.
Those factors that made the risk unacceptable in Atkins and Roper are also present
with mentally ill defendants as the six Atkins-Roper factors show.
A. Applying the Atkins-Roper Unreliability Factors to Mental Illness
1. Mental Illness and the Impairment of the Defendant’s Cooperation with his
Lawyer and of the Lawyer’s Ability to Prepare a Defense
Under the Court’s analysis, a key aspect that brings the unreliability principle
into play is if the mitigator itself impairs the defense attorney’s ability to provide
130 See Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death
Penalty Cases, supra note 75.
131 See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors
Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1559 (1998) (detailing Capital Jury Project findings that
when asked how “a history of mental illness” would affect their decision, 26.7% of capital
jurors stated it would make them “much less” likely to impose a death sentence and 29.5%
said “slightly less likely”).
132 See id. at 1564.
133 Id. at 1559 (29.5% stating “slightly less” likely and 44.3% stating “much less”). The
strongest mitigator identified by jurors was not a defendant characteristic but a “lingering
doubt” over the defendant’s guilt. Id. (16.8% stating lingering doubt would make them
“slightly less” likely and 60.4% stating they would be “much less” likely to vote for death).
Jurors, however, rarely had lingering doubts in the cases that they sat on. See Scott E. Sundby,
The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death
Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557 (1998).
134 Garvey, supra note 131, at 1559 (defendant being under eighteen would make 27.9%
of jurors “slightly less” likely and 13.6% “much less” likely to impose the death penalty).
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effective representation.135 This impairment may be because, as in Atkins, the defen-
dant is “less able to give meaningful assistance”136 even if wanting to, or, as in Roper
and Graham, because the mitigator impedes the attorney-client relationship.137 As
the Graham Court observed:
[T]he features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them
at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings. Juveniles
mistrust adults and have limited understandings of the criminal
justice system and the roles of the institutional actors within it.
They are less likely than adults to work effectively with their
lawyers to aid in their defense. Difficulty in weighing long-term
consequences; a corresponding impulsiveness; and reluctance to
trust defense counsel seen as part of the adult world a rebellious
youth rejects, all can lead to poor decisions by one charged with
a juvenile offense. These factors are likely to impair the quality
of a juvenile defendant’s representation.138
Given the critical role that defense counsel plays in crafting the “case for life”
that has become the central focus of the modern capital sentencing proceeding, the
Court unsurprisingly has viewed such impairment as imperiling the ability of the
defense to “make a persuasive showing of mitigation in the face of prosecutorial
evidence of one or more aggravating factors.”139 While this impediment is undeniably
true for intellectually disabled and juvenile defendants, a mentally ill defendant is
arguably even more debilitated as a client and witness than an intellectually disabled
or juvenile defendant.140
The cooperation issue with counsel can be particularly troublesome when the
client is suffering from paranoia, delusions, or deep depression.141 Sometimes the
client will strongly resist the “label” of mentally ill, making it impossible for the
lawyer to properly represent the defendant because the mitigating circumstance itself
(the mental illness) creates a distrust towards the lawyer and ultimately precludes
effective presentation of the mental illness to the jury.142 The saga of the trial of
135 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320–21 (2002).
136 Id. at 320.
137 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010).
138 Id. (citations omitted).
139 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
140 For a remarkably insightful look at the practical and ethical issues facing an attorney
representing a mentally ill defendant, see John D. King, Candor, Zeal, and the Substitution
of Judgment: Ethics and the Mentally Ill Criminal Defendant, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 207 (2008).
141 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 410, 416–17 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explain-
ing how the defendant’s depression caused him to fire his lawyers and seek the death penalty).
142 See United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108, 1111–13 (9th Cir. 2001) (recounting
the numerous times the defendant prevented his lawyers from rasing the defense).
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Theodore Kaczynski, the so-called “Unabomber,” vividly highlights how mental ill-
ness gravely impacts an attorney’s ability to carry out his or her constitutional duties.
Kaczynski was represented by a talented and experienced team of lawyers, but he
repeatedly tried to dismiss them because they wanted to present his mental illness
as mitigation, the evidence that presented the best chance for a life sentence.143 As a
result, the lawyers had to walk a perilous tightrope of honoring their client’s autonomy
while trying to present the strongest case for life.144 The government eventually agreed
to forego seeking the death penalty in return for a plea, and Kaczynski pled guilty,
but then almost immediately tried to withdraw his plea.145
Moreover, because the bar for finding a defendant competent to stand trial is
placed so low, even if the client wants to cooperate, he may be unable to provide
meaningful assistance because of a disjointed thought process, an inability to re-
member events accurately, or difficulty communicating. Nor will it be uncommon
for a mentally ill defendant to be on medication. But while the medication may
subdue some of the psychotic symptoms, the price often comes at the ability to assist
his attorney. As Justice Kennedy insightfully recognized in arguing against the forced
medication of a capital defendant to make him competent to stand trial:
Concerns about medication extend also to the issue of coopera-
tion with counsel. We have held that a defendant’s right to the
effective assistance of counsel is impaired when he cannot cooper-
ate in an active manner with his lawyer. The defendant must be
able to provide needed information to his lawyer and to participate
in the making of decisions on his own behalf. The side effects of
antipsychotic drugs can hamper the attorney-client relation, pre-
venting effective communication and rendering the defendant less
able or willing to take part in his defense. The State interferes with
this relation when it administers a drug to dull cognition. See Brief
for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus
Curiae 42 (“[T]he chemical flattening of a person’s will can also
lead to the defendant’s loss of self-determination undermining
the desire for self-preservation which is necessary to engage the
defendant in his own defense in preparation for his trial”).146
As with intellectually disabled and juvenile defendants, the very characteristic that
diminishes the mentally ill defendant’s culpability jeopardizes his attorney’s ability
to prepare and present the case that would persuade the jury to return a life sentence.
143 See id.
144 See id.
145 For a summary of the events surrounding his guilty plea, see generally id. Kaczynski
challenged his plea as involuntarily entered and as a violation of his rights to pro se repre-
sentation under Faretta v. California. Id.
146 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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2. The Mentally Ill Defendant as a “Poor Witness”
In addition to concerns over how a mitigating factor impairs trial preparation, the
Court has focused on how a mitigating factor may adversely affect the defendant’s
ability to have his mitigation heard at the trial itself. As with the intellectually dis-
abled defendant, the mentally ill client also is especially likely to make a “poor
witness.”147 The defendant’s mental illness may manifest itself through outbursts, an
inability to control his movements, or by making inappropriate comments or gestures,
such as the defendant who cursed at his jurors, called them “Antichrists,” and told
them that he would see them in hell where they would worship him.148 Jurors who have
witnessed such disruptive behavior are likely to interpret the defendant’s actions as
demonstrating a lack of remorse and an impulsivity that is dangerous.149
On the other hand, if the defendant is placed on antipsychotic medication to
moderate the defendant’s behavior, the side effects are likely to, in the Atkins Court’s
words, “create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes.”150
The Atkins Court was quite correct to focus on the devastating effect that a jury’s
perception of a lack of remorse has on the defendant’s case for life, because the most
common theme of jurors who voted for a death sentence was that the defendant showed
no remorse.151 And in trying to determine whether the defendant was remorseful,
jurors relied heavily on the defendant’s demeanor in trying to divine his state of
mind.152 Not surprisingly, a perceived lack of emotion made it extremely difficult
for the jurors to be receptive to the defendant’s case for life (one juror’s comment
captured well the jurors’ search for signs of remorse: “We would have liked to have
spoken to him because he showed so little emotion and so little remorse. We just
wanted to kind of figure out, are you human? We were kind of looking for anything,
anything to find remorse.”)153 As Justice Kennedy has observed, therefore, while
medicating a mentally ill defendant may reduce overt psychotic symptoms, because
the side-effect is often a flat demeanor, the “cure” is likely to mislead a jury into return-
ing a death sentence out of a mistaken conclusion that the defendant was remorseless.154
147 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320–21 (2002).
148 State v. LeGrande, 487 S.E.2d 727, 730 (N.C. 1997).
149 See Sundby, supra note 133, at 1563 & n.22 (describing jurors’ reactions to defendants
who had outbursts during trial). As one capital juror explained, watching the defendant en-
gage in shouting matches with the judge led him to conclude that the defendant was “utterly
remorseless.” Id.
150 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
151 See Sundby, supra note 133, at 1563–65.
152 Jurors’ typically described the defendant’s demeanor as emotionless, which shocked them
given that the evidence often was gruesome and highly emotional. As one juror described it,
the defendant was “blasé, an expressionless person. When we were ready to go out and give
the verdict, I was almost ready to cry, and yet there was never any expression from him. It was
like doing a trial on a wooden plank.” Id. at 1563.
153 Id. at 1564–65.
154 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“As any
trial attorney will attest, serious prejudice could result if medication inhibits the defendant’s
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3. Mental Illness and Distortion of the Defendant’s Decisionmaking
In addition to the concerns over how a mitigator can imperil a defense lawyer’s
ability to provide effective representation, the Court in Graham highlighted the un-
reliability produced by a juvenile’s “[d]ifficulty in weighing long-term consequences;
a corresponding impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust defense counsel . . . lead[ing]
to poor decisions . . . .”155 As with a juvenile defendant, the reliability of the penalty
phase can be jeopardized because of the necessity of relying on a mentally ill defen-
dant to make key strategic decisions involving constitutional rights. While the unreli-
ability can manifest itself in a number of ways, two examples highlight the problem.
The first is interference with the defendant’s decision whether to plead guilty.
The Court’s decision in Godinez v. Moran156 highlights how the unreliability principle
provides an alternative way to deal with a situation that threatens the integrity of the
capacity to react and respond to the proceedings and to demonstrate remorse or compassion.
The prejudice can be acute during the sentencing phase of the proceedings, when the sentencer
must attempt to know the heart and mind of the offender and judge his character, his contrition
or its absence, and his future dangerousness. In a capital sentencing proceeding, assessments
of character and remorse may carry great weight and, perhaps, be determinative of whether
the offender lives or dies.”)
In one rather remarkable case, the following exchange took place during trial:
Counsel Crow: Do any of the drugs that are used to treat paranoid
schizophrenics make them sleepy?
Dr. Quijano: Yes.
Counsel Crow: And that sleep would be pronounced if the drug were
taken within the recent past?
Dr. Quijano: Yes. These antipsychotic medications have a sedating
effect. So agitated people like in jail you would inject them to give
them a good night’s rest for a day or two.
Counsel Crow: Judge, can I approach the bench a minute, please?
The Court: Yes, Sir.
(Whereupon the following was had at the bench)
Counsel Crow: Judge, I don’t know that it matters, but I think I need a
break to walk my client around the room a little bit. He’s snoring kind
of loud—
Counsel Stover: They apparently injected him last time night (sic) to
calm him down and I appreciate it. But he’s sleeping right now.
Counsel Crow: I don’t know if it’s going to matter too much, but I think
it would be better if we had a minute to walk him around to wake him up.
Colburn v. Cockrell, 37 Fed. Appx. 90, at *6 n.10 (5th Cir. 2002). In part what is remarkable
is the defense counsel expressing “appreciation” that his client has been drugged to “calm
him down” even though the effect was to have his client loudly during the trial. The Fifth Circuit
dismissed Colburn’s “sleepiness” as evidence of incompetence to stand trial without any
recognition that Colburn was in that condition because of the state’s medical treatment or of
the likely effect that Colburn’s sleeping and snoring had on those observing him. Id. at *6.
155 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010).
156 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
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system. In Godinez, the defendant murdered three people in two episodes—the second
episode involved killing his ex-wife, immediately after which he attempted to commit
suicide.157 Three months later, deeply depressed and taking four medications, Godinez
fired his lawyers, pled guilty, and at the sentencing refused to present any mitigating
evidence.158 His explanation to the judge of why he wanted to represent himself was
that he wanted to prevent the presentation of any mitigating evidence, in essence ful-
filling a wish to die.159
In upholding Moran’s death sentence, the majority focused solely on the legal
meaning of “competency” and whether the term should have different meanings
depending on whether a defendant is proceeding to trial, pleading guilty, or repre-
senting himself.160 Looming in the background but unaddressed was the issue that
Atkins and Roper now directly call into question: whether a death sentence can be
treated as constitutionally reliable when imposed on an individual who is suffering
from a profound mental illness, who is taking a prescribed cocktail of anti-psychotic
medications (phenobarbital, dilantin, inderal, and vistaril), who has fired his lawyer,
and who presents no evidence in mitigation “because he opposed all efforts to mount
a defense.”161
The Atkins-Roper unreliability principle now requires that constitutional conver-
sation to take place. The focus switches from a wringing of judicial hands over the
meaning of competency as applied to a hypothetical series of situations to the bedrock
Eighth Amendment question of whether mental illness causes, in the words of Graham,
a “difficulty in weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding impulsiveness; and
reluctance to trust defense counsel . . . lead[ing] to poor decisions . . . .”162 When, as
in Godinez, the mental illness results in a complete void in mitigation for the sentencer
to consider,163 it is difficult to imagine a more fundamental failing of the central
premise of the Woodson-Lockett individualized consideration cases: without a full
accounting of the defendant’s “diverse frailties,” a “reasoned moral response” by the
sentencer is literally impossible.164
A second example of how a mental illness can distort the death penalty decision-
making process is by interfering with the defendant’s constitutional right to testify.165
157 Id. at 391.
158 Id. at 410 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
159 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
160 See id. at 396–402. Indeed, if one read only Justice Thomas’s majority opinion, the
reader would barely be aware of the full factual context that raises the question whether the
death penalty was reliable. Although Justice Blackmun’s dissent also is focused on the proper
standard for competency, his dissent provides a far fuller factual accounting. See generally
id. at 409–12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 410, 417 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
162 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010).
163 See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text.
164 See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.
165 See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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The right to testify is, in the Court’s words, “essential to our adversary system.”166
If unmedicated, the defendant while suffering from symptoms such as delusions or
profound depression will have to weigh the consequences of taking the stand—a
weighing that in theory would involve an ability to lucidly assess how his unmedi-
cated testimony is likely to be perceived by a jury whose foremost concern will be
future dangerousness.167 If medicated, on the other hand, the medication’s effects
will cast “grave doubt” on the legitimacy of the waiver of his constitutional right to
testify.168 And, of course, if he should testify, the side effects of the prescriptions
create the serious risk that the jury will perceive his manner, demeanor, and tone as
projecting remorselessness, dangerousness, or both.169 In sum, the distorted decision-
making that troubled the Court so much in the juvenile cases pose equally grave
challenges to reliability in the context of mentally ill defendants.
4. Mental Illness as the “Two-Edged Sword” Turning Mitigation into Aggravation
Part of Atkins’s rationale in finding that intellectually disabled defendants faced
a “special risk of wrongful execution” was the potential for mental retardation to be
used as a “two-edged sword.”170 The Atkins Court noted that a defendant who raises
intellectual disability as mitigation may perversely undermine his case for life by also
“enhanc[ing] the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will
be found by the jury.”171 Roper focused even more directly upon the double-edged risk
that “a defendant’s youth may even be counted against him.”172 In Roper, the prose-
cutor in his rebuttal closing argument had responded to defense counsel’s invocation
of Simmons’s youth as mitigation by arguing to the jury, “‘Age, he says. Think about
age. Seventeen years old. Isn’t that scary? Doesn’t that scare you? Mitigating? Quite
the contrary I submit. Quite the contrary.’”173
Double-edged mitigators—factors that are constitutionally mitigating under Lockett
but of a nature that allows them to be improperly flipped into aggravation—pose a
special problem when it comes to future dangerousness.174 Capital jurors have made
166 Id. at 144. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
167 See Sundby, supra note 133, at 1590 n.78 (discussing that jurors are most concerned
with a defendant’s future dangerousness).
168 See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 145 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
169 See supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text.
170 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (citing Perry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
323–25 (1989)).
171 Id. The concern over constitutionally protected mitigation being improperly turned into
aggravation first arose in Penry. See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text. As described
earlier, under Texas’s three-question scheme, Penry’s intellectual disability actually made the
jury more likely to sentence him to death by funneling the use of his disability towards a “yes”
answer to whether he posed a future danger. See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text.
172 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
173 Id. at 558.
174 For an insightful discussion of the “two-edged sword” problem, see RALPH REISNER
& CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 580–83 (2d ed. 1990).
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clear that of all aggravating factors, the defendant’s future dangerousness is always
going to constitute their foremost concern.175 In many ways jurors view themselves
as having taken a Hippocratic Oath upon being sworn in, an oath that above all else
they will not allow the defendant to kill again.176 Consequently, no matter how com-
pelling the mitigating circumstances, the jurors will return a death sentence unless
assured that the defendant will not pose a danger in the future. As the Supreme Court
recognized in Skipper v. South Carolina, a jury’s belief that a defendant will adapt
well to prison is crucial to a successful case for life.177
And when it comes to future dangerousness, mental illness is the classic ‘two-
edged sword’ from the juror’s perspective. Especially where the mental illness is
tied directly into the commission of the crime (for example, the defendant killed the
victim because of his delusional thinking), jurors are likely to view the illness as an
aggravator. One can see just how easily mental illness can be used by jurors to justify
a sentence of death from a case that involved a defendant who everyone agreed suf-
fered from severe mental illness (the state’s psychiatrist conceded that the defendant
suffered from severe mental illness).178 Even though all of the jurors agreed that the
defendant was very ill and they all had found his long struggle with schizophrenia
to be heart wrenching, the jury still voted for death; as one juror explained:
We discussed that if he were given life he would be in an eight by
eight cell for the rest of his life but might be, with good behavior,
released for exercise and have to be around other prisoners and
that could be dangerous. . . . What we decided was that regardless
of his illness, if he was a danger to society, then the only solution
would be the capital punishment.179
Another juror later summarized the jury’s decision in the case even more succinctly
when asked about the strongest factors for and against the death penalty: “For: His
incurability. Against: His illness.”180 In weighing that risk—a risk assessment that
went well beyond the evidence presented—the jury was so concerned over the
defendant’s mental illness that they, in effect, used his illness as the reason he could
not be allowed to continue living.181
175 By a significant margin, jurors cited the concern that “the defendant might pose a
future danger to society” as the factor that made them most likely to impose a death sentence.
See Garvey, supra note 131, at 1559 (37.9% stating it would make them “much more likely”
and 20% “slightly more likely” to vote for death).
176 SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH PENALTY
36–37 (2005) (examining how jurors focus on the concern that the defendant will kill again).
177 See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
178 See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries
Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1165–66 (1997).
179 Id. at 1167.
180 Id.
181 See id. at 1165–70.
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5. Mental Illness, Experts, and Scientific Uncertainty
In developing the unreliability principle, the Roper Court relied heavily on the
fact that the mental health field itself was far from settled in understanding juvenile
behavior.182 As the Court succinctly concluded, “If trained psychiatrists with the
advantage of clinical testing and observation refrain, despite diagnostic expertise,
from assessing any juvenile under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, we
conclude that States should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver condem-
nation—that a juvenile offender merits the death penalty.”183 Similar concerns run
throughout the use of experts and diagnoses when it comes to mental illness, and not
surprisingly the uncertainty and conflicting expert views often manifest themselves
at the capital penalty phase.
In Ake v. Oklahoma,184 the Court held that a psychiatrist was an “essential tool”
for the defense under the Due Process Clause when the defendant’s sanity is at issue.
A primary rationale for the Court was that the field of psychiatry was so riven with
uncertainty and disagreement that jurors needed to hear the competing views:
Psychiatry is not . . . an exact science, and psychiatrists disagree
widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness, on the
appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symp-
toms, on cure and treatment, and on likelihood of future dangerous-
ness. Perhaps because there often is no single, accurate psychiatric
conclusion on legal insanity in a given case, juries remain the pri-
mary factfinders on this issue, and they must resolve differences
in opinion within the psychiatric profession on the basis of the
evidence offered by each party. When jurors make this determi-
nation about issues that inevitably are complex and foreign, the
testimony of psychiatrists can be crucial and “a virtual necessity
if an insanity plea is to have any chance of success.”185
But while it may be a necessity to have jurors make the determination of insanity at the
guilt-innocence phase,186 Atkins and Roper now require the courts to confront whether
asking jurors to decide mental health issues that “inevitably are complex and foreign”187
introduces too much unreliability when it comes to imposing the death penalty.
182 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
183 Id.
184 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
185 Id. at 81.
186 The Ake Court was careful to not be seen as endorsing the use of psychiatric experts,
but as only reacting to the reality of the growing use of experts: “In so saying, we neither
approve nor disapprove the widespread reliance on psychiatrists but instead recognize the
unfairness of a contrary holding in light of the evolving practice.” Id. at 82.
187 Id. at 81.
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The concern is particularly heightened at the capital sentencing phase for two
reasons. First, capital jurors tend to be intensely skeptical of mental health experts
and mental health defenses presented in mitigation in a way that generally does not
extend to the prosecution’s mental health experts.188 While defense experts tend to
be viewed as hired guns who are offering up “excuses” in the form of a psychiatric
diagnosis, jurors tend not to discount the testimony of the prosecution’s experts in the
same way.189 The question of course is not whether experts’ diagnoses may some-
times be incorrect, but whether jurors are capable of sifting through the competing
psychiatric testimony to determine which testimony is reliable and which is not.190
And after Atkins and Roper, the unreliability principle commands categorical exclu-
sion if the jurors are discounting defense experts when faced with complex and con-
flicting psychiatric testimony because such discounting simply creates too much of
a “risk ‘that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for
a less severe penalty.’”191 Indeed, given that the Court has justified that a state can
severely curtail the insanity defense on the rationale that psychiatric evidence can be
too unreliable for jurors to assess,192 it is difficult to fathom how jurors can be seen
as capable of reliably assessing the same evidence in imposing a death sentence.
A second reason exists why mental illness is at special risk of being unreliably
discounted as mitigation by the jury at the sentencing phase. While a defendant’s
intellectual disability or juvenile status normally will not have been an issue at the
guilt-innocence phase,193 jurors often will already have considered the defendant’s
mental illness at the guilt-innocence phase in the form of an insanity defense. Most
188 See generally Sundby, supra note 178, at 1125–44; Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher
Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for
Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427, 477 (1980) (“The factfinder is likely to view with
considerable skepticism the defendant’s claim that he did not function as would a normal
person under the circumstances.”).
189 Sundby, supra note 178, at 1126–30 (discussing prosecutorial advantage in presentation
of experts at capital sentencing phase).
190 It may be that, as Ake suggested, it is unavoidable having a jury determine the legitimacy
of a diagnosis of schizophrenia or bipolar at the guilt-innocence phase in order to implement
an insanity defense. The Court, however, has repeatedly stressed that a risk of error that is
tolerable in a non-capital case can become unconstitutional in the capital sentencing context.
As the Lockett Court observed early on, “[t]he need for treating each defendant in a capital
case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more important
than in noncapital cases,” and the Court has built on that premise repeatedly over the ensuing
years. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
191 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605).
192 See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 774 (2006) (justifying Arizona’s restrictions on
the insanity defense because of “the controversial character of some categories of mental
disease, . . . the potential of mental-disease evidence to mislead, and . . . the danger of
according greater certainty to capacity evidence than experts claim for it”).
193 Intellectual disability could possibly be an issue at the guilt-innocence phase if the state
recognizes diminished capacity. See id. at 772–73.
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states now use some variation of the M’Naghten test for insanity,194 requiring a
defendant to make the extremely difficult showing that he did not know the differ-
ence between “right” and “wrong.” And while mental illness under Lockett still
qualifies as powerful mitigation even if the illness did not prevent him from under-
standing the difference between “right” and “wrong,” jurors are often confused on
this point.195 As a result, the distinct risk arises that jurors, already having deliberated
on the defendant’s mental illness and having “rejected” it in the form of the insanity
defense, will improperly dismiss or discount it at the penalty phase.
6. The Crime’s “Brutality” and the Mentally Ill Defendant
Part of Roper’s finding of unreliability rested on the grounds that “the brutality
or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower . . . even where the
juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity
should require a sentence less severe than death.”196 The danger is especially acute
for a mentally ill defendant, because the illness sometimes will result in crimes being
committed in a particularly bizarre, brutal, or sadistic manner.
One need not search far in the case reports to find capital crimes committed by
mentally ill defendants in particularly frightening or gruesome ways that would
make for sensationalistic headlines: A defendant who heard voices through clocks
uttering Old Testament apocalyptic warnings; one who consumed his own bodily
wastes; another who cut out the organs of his two little children and wife in order
to kill the demons living inside them, and who then placed the organs in his pockets
and returned home and tried to commit suicide.197 And although a juror is likely to
react to these crimes by thinking to themselves, that is “sick” or “crazy,” the pure
repugnancy of the crime and the fear that is triggered may “overpower” the mitiga-
tion. And, of course, the brutality and bizarreness of the crime is especially likely
to raise the double-edged sword dilemma of the mitigating evidence playing directly
into the jurors’ fears over future dangerousness.198 The Roper Court’s worry that a
crime’s brutality would overpower the mitigation of a defendant’s juvenile status,
therefore, is an even greater concern with the mentally ill defendant.
194 See id. at 750–51 (reviewing different states’ approaches to the insanity defense).
195 See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Scott E. Sundby, Competent Capital
Representation: The Necessity of Knowing and Heeding What Jurors Tell Us About Mitigation,
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1035, 1063–64 & n.117 (2008) (explaining the potential difficulties
posed by statutory mitigating factors).
196 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
197 See Marc Bookman, 13 Men Condemned to Die Despite Severe Mental Illness, MOTHER
JONES (Feb. 12, 2013, 7:02 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/01/death-penalty
-cases-mental-illness-clemency (summarizing cases where mentally ill defendants have been
sentenced to death).
198 See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text.
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B. Defining Mental Illness as a Categorical Exclusion from the Death Penalty
Application of the unreliability principle to mentally ill defendants demonstrates
that once Atkins and Roper are properly understood as a natural progression in the
Woodson-Lockett individualized consideration line of cases, other categories of miti-
gation become subject to the unreliability inquiry regardless of national consensus.
Freed from the national consensus threshold, the inquiry becomes one focused entirely
on whether the constitutionally protected class of mitigation can be reliably assessed
by the sentencer based on the six Atkins-Roper factors.
As with most categorical exclusions, the boundaries of the mental illness category
will need to be defined and refined as it is implemented. The experience with Atkins
and intellectual disability has shown that the lack of a bright-line boundary like age is
not an insurmountable barrier to implementing the exclusion. The Court in Hall v.
Florida199 was able to look at various standards for defining intellectual disability,
draw upon expertise in the field establishing that intellectual disability is not simply
an IQ number applied in cookie cutter fashion, and provide further guidance as states
work at implementing Atkins.200
That the need will exist to define what constitutes mental illness and that the
definition will engender both legislative and judicial debate is thus not an objection
in itself. Moreover, as Professor Slobogin has pointed out, despite the elasticity of
the phrase “mental illness” as a general term, when the focus is on psychosis with
gross impairments, diagnostic agreement is relatively high.201 Questions of fact may
exist in any one case as to whether a defendant has crossed the threshold of mental
illness, but as Atkins illustrates, fact finding and litigation is the inevitable byproduct
of any line drawing endeavor.
Nor will states be starting from scratch in fashioning a mental illness exclusion as
several standards already have been proposed or utilized. Prior to abolishing capital
punishment, Connecticut by statute excluded an individual whose “mental capacity was
199 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (striking down Florida’s rule that a defendant could not make
an Atkins claim unless he had an IQ test of seventy or below).
200 See id. at 1994–95, 2000–01.
201 Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean, supra note 36, at 307–08 & n.101. The relatively
high agreement on diagnosis does not undermine the fifth Atkins-Roper factor concerning
the uncertainty surrounding the use of psychiatric evidence. Even with intellectual disability,
mental health professionals often disagree over whether a defendant has, say, an IQ of sixty
or sixty-five, but that disagreement would not change the fact that an IQ of that level would
constitute “intellectual disability” placing the defendant outside the death penalty; as Atkins
makes clear, once beyond the threshold of “intellectual disability,” even if disagreement
might exist over the effects of the disability on the individual defendant, the risk of mistaken
application of the death penalty is simply too great. Likewise, with mental illness, once the
determined threshold has been crossed, the risk of confusion when psychiatrists present
conflicting opinions about the effects of a mental illness on the defendant would present too
great a risk of error for the death penalty to be considered. Cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 320 (2002).
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significantly impaired or [his] ability to conform [his] conduct to the requirements
of law was significantly impaired but not so impaired in either case as to constitute
a defense to prosecution.”202 The American Bar Association has recommended barring
the death penalty from being imposed on those who “had a severe mental disorder or
disability that significantly impaired their capacity (a) to appreciate the nature, conse-
quences or wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) to exercise rational judgment in relation
to conduct, or (c) to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law.”203 From the
perspective of the unreliability principle, the key is that whatever standard is ulti-
mately adopted, the legislative (or judicial) line be drawn in a manner that always
excludes defendants whose mental illness poses a risk that the jury’s “reasoned moral
response” cannot reliably assess the defendant’s individual culpability.
III. THE UNRELIABILITY PRINCIPLE AND THE UNRAVELING OF THE DEATH PENALTY
The focus up to this point has been on how the Atkins-Roper constitutional prohibi-
tion against imposing the death penalty because of the unreliability principle applies
to categories of mitigation in addition to intellectual disability and juvenile status.
What is particularly intriguing about the unreliability principle, however, is that it
also holds the possibility of allowing a global challenge to the death penalty in a man-
ner that has not been available since McCleskey v. Kemp204 in 1987. It was Justice
Scalia in Roper who saw this logical endpoint to where the Court’s reasoning leads:
The Court concludes . . . that juries cannot be trusted with
the delicate task of weighing a defendant’s youth along with the
other mitigating and aggravating factors of his crime. This star-
tling conclusion undermines the very foundations of our capital
sentencing system, which entrusts juries with “mak[ing] the dif-
ficult and uniquely human judgments that defy codification and
that ‘buil[d] discretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal system.’”
McCleskey, supra, at 311 (quoting H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The
American Jury 498 (1966)). The Court says, . . . that juries will be
unable to appreciate the significance of a defendant’s youth when
faced with details of a brutal crime. . . .
Nor does the Court suggest a stopping point for its reasoning.
If juries cannot make appropriate determinations in cases involv-
ing murderers under 18, in what other kinds of cases will the
Court find jurors deficient? We have already held that no jury
may consider whether a mentally deficient defendant can receive
the death penalty, irrespective of his crime. See Atkins, 536 U.S.,
202 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(h)(3) (2009).
203 ABA Comm. on Mental and Physical Disability Law, Res. 122A (2006).
204 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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at 321. Why not take other mitigating factors, such as consider-
ations of childhood abuse or poverty, away from juries as well?
Surely jurors “overpower[ed]” by “the brutality or cold-blooded
nature” of a crime, . . . could not adequately weigh these mitigat-
ing factors either.205
And Justice Scalia is correct: Atkins and Roper’s reasoning calls into question the
Court’s most fundamental post-Furman promise that reliability can be assured because
jurors are able to give full individualized consideration to each defendant.
By recognizing that the death penalty cannot be imposed if mitigation is beyond
the sentencer’s ability to reliably assess the evidence, Atkins and Roper call for re-
examination of all aspects of the “delivery” and “receipt” of mitigation for reliability
and consistency.206 Justice Scalia’s dissent raises an initial question to be explored:
if empirical research shows that jurors are often not giving mitigation full consider-
ation once they have convicted the defendant of a brutal crime, how can the consti-
tutional promise of Woodson and Lockett be seen as being kept?207 Numerous other
questions come readily to mind: Do particular types of cases in aggravation, for
example the murder of a child, “overpower” the jurors’ ability to be receptive to
mitigation?208 Is the aggravator of future dangerousness that the Court sanctioned
over thirty years ago despite the lack of reliability in predicting dangerousness now
ripe for reconsideration?209 Or might the systemic lack of resources for the investiga-
tion and presentation of mitigation provide a viable claim under the unreliability
principle since the Woodson-Lockett cases are premised upon the idea that juries in
all capital cases are hearing a full and effective presentation of mitigation before
deciding to impose the death penalty?210
These are but a few possible avenues of exploration that arise once the jury’s
ability to reliably consider mitigation is placed under constitutional scrutiny, and the
205 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 620–21 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s
awareness of the implications of the majority’s reasoning may result from his own candid ac-
knowledgement as far back as McCleskey that, “it is my view that the unconscious operation
of irrational sympathies and antipathies including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence)
prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions of this court, and ineradicable.”
See Scott E. Sundby, The Loss of Constitutional Faith: McCleskey v. Kemp and the Dark
Side of Procedure, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 5, 33 (2012).
206 See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
207 See generally SUNDBY, supra note 176, at 125–29 (describing how some jurors after
hearing about brutality of crime are not receptive to mitigation).
208 The Capital Jury Project, for instance, has found that jurors find a crime involving a
child victim as extremely aggravating. See Garvey, supra note 131, at 1556 tbl. 3.
209 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983) (rejecting challenge to predictions
of dangerousness because the majority was not convinced such evidence was “almost entirely
unreliable,” a drastically lower standard than the Atkins-Roper unreliability standard would
require to pass constitutional muster).
210 Cf. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 917–18 (2012) (detailing the shortcomings in
Alabama’s system of capital representation).
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issues that need to be explored will only expand as scientific knowledge of how we
make decisions reveals problems that were not even anticipated at the time that
Furman and Gregg were decided. As just one example, the burgeoning research on
implicit bias (also referred to as “unconscious prejudice”) raises serious questions
about whether jurors can provide the “reasoned moral response” that is the essential
linchpin of the Court’s post-Furman cure to arbitrariness.211
Research on implicit bias has revealed through a variety of techniques in a wide
range of situations how decisions that we very much would like to believe are purely
“rational” and fact-based are often influenced by unconsciously held attitudes on
matters such as race, gender, and age.212 In fact, emerging evidence shows that the
decision-making locus in our brains actually shifts between different regions de-
pending on how strongly we can identify with the person who is being judged or
evaluated.213 Consequently, without any conscious recognition that they are doing
so, individuals will vary their judgments and decisions based on whom they are
judging or assessing. As researchers in the area have demonstrated, the role of im-
plicit bias in decisionmaking has significant implications for important everyday
decisions such as who is hired,214 how talent is assessed,215 or even how medical
treatment is dispensed.216
The implications of implicit bias for capital decisionmaking are far reaching,
and already some studies have begun to pull back the veil on how sentencers are
affected. While a comprehensive examination is beyond this Article’s scope, one
211 See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
212 See generally Irene V. Blair, Implicit Stereotypes and Prejudice, in COGNITIVE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 359 (Gordon B. Moskowitz ed., 2001) (reviewing the relevant literature);
Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 945, 946 (2006).
213 See generally Sergi G. Costafreda, Michael J. Brammer, Anthony S. David & Cynthia
H. Y. Fu, Predictors of Amygdale Activation during the Processing of Emotional Stimuli: A
Meta-Analysis of 385 PET and fMRI Studies, 58 BRAIN RES. REV. 57 (2008); Frank Van
Overwalle, Social Cognition and the Brain: A Meta-Analysis, 30 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 829
(2009); Elizabeth A. Phelps, Kevin J. O’Connor, William A. Cunningham, E. Sunnie Funayama,
J. Christopher Gatenby, John C. Gore & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Performance on Indirect Mea-
sures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
729 (2000).
214 See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination,
94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 998 (2004) (job applicants with white-sounding names such as
Emily or Greg were 50% more likely to receive callback job interviews in Boston and 49%
more likely in Chicago than applicants with black-sounding names like Jamal).
215 See, e.g., Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of
“Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 738 (2000) (having
musicians audition behind a screen increases by 50% the chances that a female musician will
advance out of preliminary rounds).
216 See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:
Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 19–20 (1995) (calling for a
method to detect unconscious stereotyping and exploring potential methods).
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study gives a sense of how findings in the area eventually may force courts to step
back and reassess the assumptions underlying the reliability of post-Furman capital
punishment schemes. In the study, researchers obtained photographs of African-
American males who had been convicted of murdering white victims.217 They then
showed the photos to subjects who were unaware that the photos were of convicted
murderers and asked the subjects to rate the photographs based on “the stereotypicality
of each Black defendant’s appearance and were told they could use any number of
features (e.g., lips, nose, hair texture, skin tone) to arrive at their judgments.”218
After controlling for variables such as severity of the murder and the strength of
mitigating circumstances, the study found that defendants who had murdered a white
victim and who had been rated by the subjects in the top half of being stereotypically
black had double the chance of receiving a death sentence than those defendants
who were in the bottom half of appearing stereotypically black.219 As the researchers
concluded, “[t]he present research demonstrates that in actual sentencing decisions,
jurors may treat [Black physical] traits as powerful cues to deathworthiness.”220
Studies like this emphasize not only the need to readdress the role of race in the
death penalty, they come at a time when new constitutional tools exist that can better
incorporate the findings of unconscious bias. The Court’s last effort to directly address
the role of race was in 1987 when, in McCleskey v. Kemp, it refused by a slender 5–4
margin to provide constitutional relief despite strong statistical evidence that the race
of the victim was influencing capital outcomes.221 Driven in part by a deep distrust
of statistics, Justice Powell for the majority refused to infer that bias was at work
and instead required individual defendants to make the almost impossible showing
that his sentencer was affirmatively acting out of racial animus.222
With the insights provided by implicit bias research, the empirical basis now
exists to connect the statistical dots that the McCleskey majority declined to connect
because it said it lacked a reason to believe that the statistics were explained by
217 Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Paul G. Davies, Valerie J. Purdie-Vaughns & Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts
Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 384 (2006).
218 Id.
219 Id. By contrast, a heightened death sentencing rate did not exist where the victim was
also African-American; an outcome that the researchers suggest might be due to the jury
viewing a black-on-black killing as more of an interpersonal rather than intergroup conflict.
Id. at 385.
220 Id. An intriguing body of research consistent with the capital sentencing study is finding
that it is Afrocentric features more than race that appears to be influencing sentencing generally.
See generally William T. Pizzi, Irene V. Blair & Charles M. Judd, Discrimination in
Sentencing on the Basis of Afrocentric Features, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 327 (2005) (finding
bias in criminal sentencing against persons who had facial features culturally marked as
Afrocentric, regardless of whether they were racially identified as white or black).
221 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
222 See id. at 297; Sundby, supra note 205, at 6–7 (using Justice Powell’s papers to examine
the writing of the McCleskey opinion).
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jurors’ biases.223 Moreover, the Atkins-Roper unreliability principle now makes it
constitutionally clear that intentional racial animus is not necessary for a constitutional
violation: If a jury is unable to give effect to constitutionally protected evidence be-
cause of bias, whether conscious or unconscious, then the system has failed to pro-
vide the reliability and consistency that the Woodson-Lockett line of cases promised
was the fundamental cure for Furman arbitrariness. In short, the unreliability prin-
ciple provides an express constitutional invitation to revisit McCleskey.
CONCLUSION
Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons have been lauded as important cases
under the Court’s Eighth Amendment disproportionality analysis. And the cases are
undoubtedly significant milestones along the “evolving standards of a civilized
society” continuum. This Article has argued, however, that the cases’ more lasting
impact may very well come from a different constitutional direction that looks not
towards disproportionality, but to the Court’s long-standing emphasis on the consti-
tutional relationship between individualized consideration and reliability. By articu-
lating what this Article has called the “unreliability principle,” the cases take the
Woodson-Lockett line of cases to their next logical step: if a category of mitigation is
constitutionally protected because it is necessary to individualized consideration but
the sentencer is unable to reliably assess and consider the mitigation, then categorical
exclusion is constitutionally required.
It is this aspect of Atkins and Roper’s reasoning that places individuals with
serious mental illness beyond the death penalty’s jurisdiction, whether or not a national
consensus against such executions exists. The six Atkins-Roper factors that identify
when mitigation is beyond reliable assessment apply to mentally ill defendants with
equal if not greater force. The potential impact of the Atkins-Roper unreliability prin-
ciple, however, extends beyond mental illness and other categories of constitutionally
protected mitigation.224 The reasoning behind the principle calls into question the
reliability of the entire system in a manner that has not been examined for decades and
opens a constitutional door for the courts to begin taking into account the advances
over the past forty years in our understanding of the dynamics of human decision-
making. And this may prove to be the true legacy of Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v.
Simmons: the raising of old questions about the reliability of the capital punishment
system with a new vigor and a new perspective.
223 Interestingly, it was Justice Scalia who, of the McCleskey majority, was willing to
candidly acknowledge that implicit biases were at work. See supra note 205 (recounting
Justice Scalia’s proposed concurrence in McCleskey).
224 If mentally ill individuals are removed from the pool of death-eligible defendants, the
number of death sentences will shrink yet again. In a capital punishment system that already
is imposing significantly fewer than 100 death sentences annually, Justice Scalia may well
be proven correct in predicting that we are in the process of the “incremental abolition” of
capital punishment. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 353 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
